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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Article 8, Section 3, of tho v**ah 
Constitution, and Utah Code Annotated, --.--. (19:; its amended) 
and Rule 3A, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated April 6, 
1988, and entered April * - b\ * .i*- fonorable , v Tibbs, 
S : - . - i i . : * i-i. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The Di stri ct Court properly ruled that the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act is the exclusive means for recording a lien on a 
motor vehicle in the State of Utah and that ai I I mperfected 
security interest fi 1 ed under the Utah uniform Commercial Code is 
without effect as t< i a clear titl* <n a licensed motorized 
vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Plaintiffs instituted this 
action against defendants for a determination that plaintiffs7 
claim to a 1978 International cement mixer, ten yard, Cummins 
230 (the "cement mixer"), prevails over defendants7 interests in 
the cement mixer. 
2. Course of Proceedings. On October 27, 1987, 
plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Relief in 
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State 
of Utah, civil number 10140, requesting a determination that 
plaintiffs own and that defendants have no interest in the cement 
mixer. (R.l) Valley Bank and Trust company and Valley Central 
Bank (collectively referred to as "Valley") filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim. The Counterclaim sought attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs replied to Valley's Counterclaim (R.54) and the 
parties began discovery proceedings. 
On March 3, 1988, Valley filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was followed by a Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by plaintiffs on March 9, 1988. (R.163, 177) 
After hearing both parties7 Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs granted plaintiffs7 motion and denied 
Valley7s motion. (R.197) On April 6, 1988, the court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that F. Creer 
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has title to, and Valley has no interest in, the cement mixer• 
(R.203; Addendum No. 1) Judgment against Valley was entered by 
the court on April 6, 1988 (R.208) and on May 1, 1988, Valley 
filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. (R.212) 
Both parties subsequently moved for summary disposition of the 
case, which motions were denied by the court and the appeal was 
reserved for plenary review. 
3. Statement of Facts. On April 22, 1982, Lays Rock 
Products, Inc. ("Lays"), executed and delivered to Valley a 
promissory note ("Note") in the principal sum of $250,000. 
(R.204) As security for the Note, Lays executed and delivered to 
Valley a security agreement granting Valley a security interest 
in certain personal property, including the cement mixer, which 
is the subject of this action. (R.204) Lays was the owner and 
had possession of the cement mixer at the time the security 
agreement was executed. (R.8) Valley never perfected their 
security interest. (R.167,204) Lays was later merged into L.A. 
Young Sons Construction Company ("L.A. Young"). (R. 167,204). 
Between approximately June, 1986, and March, 1987, 
Plaintiff, John Preston Creer ("J.P. Creer") performed legal 
services for L. A. Young. (R.204) L. A. Young, however, failed 
to compensate J. P. Creer, for his legal services and in March, 
1987, J.P. Creer informed L. A. Young that he would not continue 
legal representation unless L. A. Young paid J. P. Creer's legal 
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bill. (R.205) As a result, L. A. Young, through its president, 
Alan G. Young, executed and delivered to J. P. Creer a 
certificate of title to the cement mixer. (R.205) J.P. Creer 
later transferred title to the cement mixer to his son, 
plaintiff, Frank Creer ("F. Creer"). (R.205) J. P. Creer had no 
notice of the filing by Valley Bank prior to receiving the title 
to the motor vehicle. (R.205) 
At the time he received title to the cement mixer, J.P. 
Creer intended and understood that it was being transferred in 
partial satisfaction of L.A. Young's debt to J.P. Creer for 
previously rendered legal services and that it was not intended 
as security for that debt. (R.205) F. Creer obtained possession 
of the cement mixer but thereafter relinquished possession after 
being told by Alan Young that there might be violence upon his 
person. (R. 181-182, 190-191) The cement mixer remained in the 
possession of L. A. Young until Marcus Taylor, as receiver, took 
possession of it. (R.181,191) Neither J.P. Creer nor F. Creer 
asserts a security interest in the cement mixer, but rather base 
their claim to the cement mixer on an ownership interest 
evidenced by a clear certificate of title from the Department of 
Motor Vehicles. (R.205) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The recording provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act 
are the sole and exclusive means by which one can encumber a 
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title to a licensed motor vehicle in the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT NO. 1 
THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE ACT IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR 
OBTAINING AND PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH ON A REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLE 
Plaintiff/Respondent relies upon Draper Bank & Trust 
Company v. Ed Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983). It should be 
pointed out that this case has nothing to do with motor vehicles 
in a dealers7 inventory. In the Draper Bank & Trust case: 
The general rule governing liens on motor vehicles not 
in a dealer's inventory is that perfection of a lien is 
governed exclusively by the filing and title provisions 
of the Motor Vehicle Act, U.C.A., 1953, §§41-1-81 and 
41-1-86. 
Under these provisions the perfection of a lien on an 
automobile depends upon the appearance of the lien 
interest on the vehicle's certificate of title. The 
filing of a financing statement pursuant to Article 9 
is not effective to protect a lien interest in an 
automobile sold to a consumer. §41-1-80(2) and §70A-9-
302(3)(b)... Thus, these provisions treat the 
perfection of a security interest for the financing of 
automobiles held in a dealer's inventory for resale 
differently from a security interest in an automobile 
for some other reason. Other jurisdictions have 
uniformly interpreted §9-302(3)(b) in the same way, as 
has one well-known U.C.C. commentator. (Pg. 1177) 
The court then goes on, in a footnote, to cite many 
other states who have sustained the motor vehicle title laws as 
the exclusive means of perfecting title in a motor vehicle. 
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In Manufacturers Credit Corporation v. Peoples Trust of 
New Jersey, 441 F.2d 1313 (CA Third Circuit) held specifically 
that: 
We have held that where the Certificate of Ownership 
Law of New Jersey is applicable to the filing of a 
security interest in a motor vehicle, its provisions, 
and not those of the New Jersey Uniform Commercial 
Code, govern the proper method of filing. (Citations 
omitted) 
This same provision was held IN RE Vinarsky, 287 
F.Supp. 446, wherein a New York court ruled: 
A security instrument filed through the provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code were null and void because 
they failed to file a lien with the Motor Vehicle Code. 
Practically speaking, there would be chaos in 
transference of titles of motor vehicles if an unperfected 
security interest was not recorded of record under the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act in the Utah Motor Vehicle Department. Under Valley 
Bank's theory, everyone would have to check with the Department 
of Business Regulation to see if someone had an unperfected 
security interest filed against their automobile as they went to 
seek title from the Utah Motor Vehicle Department. 
Motor vehicles are governed exclusively by the filing 
and title provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended, Sections 41-1-81, 41-1-86. 
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Section 41-1-83 of U.C.A. 1953, states as follows: 
(1) Upon receipt of a title application the department 
shall file it, and when satisfied as to the 
authenticity of the application, shall issue a new 
certificate of title in usual form, giving the 
name of the owner and a statement of all liens and 
encumbrances certified to the department as 
existing under the vehicle. 
If a lien or encumbrance was not certified to the 
Department, as it was not in this case, the Department of Motor 
Vehicles would have no way of knowing if there was a lien or 
encumbrance and would therefore clear the title and issue a new 
certificate. 
Further, Section 41-1-85, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
states as follows: 
The filing and issuance of a new certificate of title 
under 41-1-82 and 41-1-83 constitute constructive 
notice of all liens and encumbrances against the 
vehicle to creditors of the owner, or subsequent 
purchasers and encumbrancers. 
Note constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances. 
A lien or encumbrance recorded elsewhere would not be 
constructive notice to a creditor or subsequent purchaser. 
Further 41-1-87, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) states: 
This method provided in Section 41-1-82 through 41-1-86 
of giving constructive notice of a lien or encumbrance 
upon a registered vehicle is exclusive. 
Exclusive is exclusive. 
Andersons Uniform Commercial Code, 9-302:19 under 
Motor Vehicles, states as follows: 
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In many states, local variations of the Code expressly 
declare that the perfection of a security interest in a 
motor vehicle shall be governed by a motor vehicle title 
registration statute, with the consequence that the 
Code is not applicable thereto. The Uniform Commercial 
Code gives each state the option of providing a non-
Code system of perfection for security interests in 
motor vehicles by providing for central filing and 
certificate notation. The translation of the 
perfecting of security interests in motor vehicles to a 
title certificate statute effects not only a change in 
the place of filing but also a change as to what is 
filed: under the Code, the filing is of a financing 
statement, or a security agreement in lieu of a 
financing statement, whereas under the title 
certificate statute the paper which is filed is an 
application for a title certificate to the collateral 
vehicle in which application it is recited that the 
vehicle is subject to a lien or security interest in 
favor of the secured party. 
When the perfection of a security interest in a motor 
vehicle is governed by non-Code law, the creditor must 
comply with that law or his interest is not perfected, 
even though the creditor files a financing statement 
which would be sufficient under the Code if other 
collateral were involved. Code §9-302(2) declares 
unambiguously that a security interest in property 
covered by a statute which provides for central filing 
of, or which requires indication of a security interest 
on a certificate of title, may be perfected only by 
registration or filing under such statute or by 
indication of the security interest on a certificate of 
title or a duplicate thereof issued under such statute. 
The rationale for the exemption of motor vehicles from 
the general pattern of Article 9 is the recognition of 
the wide-spread existence of local statutes governing 
the subject. 
Further, the Utah Uniform Commercial Code , 70A-9-
302(3) states as follows: 
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The filing of a financing statement otherwise required 
by this chapter is not necessary or effective to 
perfect a security interest in property subject to and 
(b) those statutes of this state which provide 
for the indication of security interest on certificate. 
We have already reviewed the other statutes of the 
State (the Motor Vehicle Act) which provide for "the indication 
of security interest on the certificate". This section says that 
the filing of a financing statement is not effective to perfect a 
security interest. 
There is no provision, under the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Act, for unperfected security interests. The lien or encumbrance 
is either recorded on the certificate of title or it is not. If 
it is not it has no legal affect on obtaining a clear motor 
vehicle title. 
There is no issue in this case as to competing interest 
of record on the motor vehicle title as to which has priority 
over the other. Valley Bank did not record anything of record 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. 
SUMMARY 
The various requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code 
are not part of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents had no notice of the U.C.C. filing. They had 
possession of the truck but relinquished it under threat of 
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violence. They received the truck in payment of a debt. The 
title actually issued listed no liens or encumbrances. 
The plaintiffs/respondents urge the court to reaffirm 
the Draper Bank (supra) case, that the Utah Motor Vehicle Act is 
the exclusive means for recording liens or encumbrances on motor 
vehicles in the State of Utah and that its provisions and not 
those of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code govern the proper 
method of filing. Lastly, that an unperfected security interest 
filed under the Uniform Commercial Code does not in any way cloud 
or supersede the title if it is not properly recorded under the 
Utah Motor Vehicles Act. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of September, 1988. 
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